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Abstract: Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) and Marburg
hemorrhagic fever (MHF) are rare viral diseases, endemic
to central Africa. The overall burden of EHF and MHF is
small in comparison to the more common protozoan,
helminth, and bacterial diseases typically referred to as
neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). However, EHF and
MHF outbreaks typically occur in resource-limited set-
tings, and many aspects of these outbreaks are a direct
consequence of impoverished conditions. We will discuss
aspects of EHF and MHF disease, in comparison to the
‘‘classic’’ NTDs, and examine potential ways forward in the
prevention and control of EHF and MHF in sub-Saharan
Africa, as well as examine the potential for application of
novel vaccines or antiviral drugs for prevention or control
of EHF and MHF among populations at highest risk for
disease.
Introduction
Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) and Marburg hemorrhagic
fever (MHF) are two similar clinical diseases caused by viruses of
the genera Ebolavirus (EBOV) and Marburgvirus (MARV), respec-
tively, both of the family Filoviridae [1]. Owing to largely
sensationalist accounts of outbreaks [2], these diseases are widely
recognized, despite the overall rarity of their occurrence [3].
However, EBOV and MARV are highly pathogenic, and have
traditionally been associated with devastating outbreaks, with case
fatality ranging from 25% to 90% [4]. Additionally, EBOV and
MARV are considered potential bioweapons agents [5], and as
such are classified as class A select agents. While the ability to
conduct research on infectious EBOV and MARV is limited to a
small number of high containment laboratories, extensive funding
has been applied to primary research in the past decade, and
progress has been made in understanding the biology of these
viruses, as well as toward development of potential therapies [6,7].
However, from the perspective of those at most risk of disease, this
progress has not been experienced. Large outbreaks of EHF in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2007 and 2008, and in
Uganda in 2007 [8–10], have demonstrated the continued
potential for prolonged virus transmission in impoverished rural
communities. We will discuss the epidemiology and control of
EHF and MHF, relative to the concepts of neglected tropical
diseases (NTDs).
Epidemiology of Ebola and Marburg Hemorrhagic
Fever
EBOV and MARV are zoonotic viruses, and outside of
outbreaks, do not persist in human populations. Current data
suggest fruit bats as the reservoir of EBOV and MARV, and the
distribution of both viruses appears to be limited to sub-Saharan
Africa [11–14] (with the exception of Reston ebolavirus (REBOV),
identified in the Philippines, and not recognized to be associated
with human disease [15,16]). Clusters and outbreaks are primarily
the result of person-to-person transmission of these viruses, which
occurs through direct contact with the body, bodily fluids
(commonly to health care workers), or contaminated clothes or
linens of an infected person [17–21]. The level of viremia, and
thus presumptively the risk of transmission, corresponds with
disease severity, with highest concentrations of the virus during
later stages of disease [22,23].
Three distinct contact modalities account for virus transmission
during outbreaks (summarized in Table 1): 1) transmission
between family members, close contacts, and care givers of sick
individuals; 2) contact with dead bodies during preparation and
funeral proceedings; and 3) transmission in health care settings
from sick patients to medical staff or to other hospitalized patients
by breaches in barrier nursing and reusing medical equipment
[18,19,24–28]. As a result, outbreak response involves three major
components: 1) daily observation of all contacts of sick individuals,
so that upon onset of illness, persons can be transported to medical
facilities and avoid further transmission in the community; 2)
ensuring safe burials of deceased individuals; and 3) establishment
of patient isolation wards, with medical staff equipped with and
trained in usage of personal-protective equipment, to block health
care–associated transmission of the virus [26,29–34].
While logistically challenging, the above interventions are not
technologically difficult. These have consistently been applied in
outbreaks, and are effective in stopping the chains of transmission.
So why do large EHF and MHF outbreaks continue to occur?
Response activities are contingent on identification of the
outbreak. A common occurrence among large outbreaks is the
large lag, often in the range of months, between initial cases and
actual detection of EBOV or MARV [35]. Typical symptoms of
EHF and MHF, such as fever, vomiting, diarrhea, fatigue,
headache, and myalgia [9,24,25,36,37], can be mistaken for other
more frequent endemic tropical infections. However, the fact that
outbreaks occur most commonly in resource-limited settings
should not be overlooked. Other important aspects include limited
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surveillance and the inability to rapidly perform diagnostic testing.
Additionally, while the zoonotic source of exposure is not always
identified in outbreaks, introductions of these viruses to human
populations have been associated with entering caves and mines
(for MARV) and hunting for or processing bushmeat (for EBOV)
[38–45]. Educational interventions aimed at discouraging these
activities (or potentially directly blocking physical access to caves
or mines) have the potential to limit introduction of EBOV and
MARV into human populations. For instance, education outreach
was performed in the border region of Republic of the Congo
(RoC) and Gabon after a series of EHF outbreaks occurred over
numerous years, starting in 1994; however, no outbreaks have
occurred since 2005 [44]. Similarly, introduction of MARV
occurred for numerous years among miners in Watsa Zone of
DRC [39], and cases of MHF ceased only following flooding of the
mine [46]. Finally, among routes of filovirus transmission to
humans, it may be important to consider the role of other potential
secondary hosts. REBOV, and its association with primates from
the Philippines, was identified previously [47]. While serologic
evidence indicated that humans exposed to infectious primates
may be infected, REBOV does not appear to cause overt disease
in humans [47,48]. Interestingly, REBOV was recently identified
in commercial swine in the Philippines, and similarly, evidence of
seropositive humans exposed to these animals was observed [15].
Recent laboratory studies have demonstrated that REBOV, as
well as ZEBOV, not only infects, but also may be transmitted
among swine [49,50]. The scenario that either a pathogenic
filovirus may enter (and be transmitted among swine) or that
mutations in REBOV may result in a virus pathogenic to humans
should continue to be considered in global surveillance efforts. In
addition to the direct impact on human health, the potential
economic impact on agricultural production, if swine (or other
livestock) are a direct or perceived threat for transmission of
filoviruses, would likely be devastating to a local or regional
economy.
Ebola and Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever as NTDs
Currently there is no standardized definition of an NTD
[51,52], and various groups have applied differing standards in the
classification of NTDs. Liese et al. summarized two district
approaches to characterizing NTDs, the first as ‘‘neglect as the
defining characteristic’’, and the second as ‘‘the diseases’ shared
features and their effects on poverty and development’’ [51]. The
latter of these two approaches has focused on a group of 13 specific
protozoan, helminth, and bacterial infections that have a large
global burden of disease and strong poverty-promoting effect, and
persist as chronic infections despite effective medical treatments
available [53,54]. (Recently, proposals have expanded this list of
NTDs to a total of 17 specific infectious agents [55]). Focusing on
the former approach, an important aspect is the direct role of
neglect as a contributing factor to NTDs. Previous reviews have
described the impact of NTDs on the ‘‘bottom billion’’, i.e., the
portion of the human population living in the most impoverished
conditions [56]. Similarly, the ‘‘vicious cycle’’ of interrelatedness
between poverty and infectious diseases has been noted by the
World Health Organization (WHO) [57].
A major component of the ‘‘13 NTDs’’ is the underlying high
burden of disease, both from a morbidity and mortality
standpoint, as well as from an economic standpoint. One estimate
suggests more than 500,000 deaths annually as a result of these
diseases [58]. The burden of EHF and MHF globally is
substantially lower (and in comparison to the economic impact
of the 13 NTDs [59], the overall economic impact of EHF and
MHF would be marginal in comparison). To date, approximately
2,300 total EHF and MHF cases have been recognized [3,60].
There are some data to suggest this number to be a substantial
underestimate. Serosurveys in central Africa have reported the
prevalence of reactive antibodies to EBOV in human populations
to range from 5% to 15%, implying a much high burden of
infection [61–63]. Since 1976, in large outbreaks of EHF and
MHF, the time from initial cases to outbreak confirmation has
typically taken months [35,64]; thus, it is likely that smaller, brief
outbreaks or isolated cases frequently go unrecognized, especially
in remote areas. During an intense prospective surveillance
program from 1981 to 1985 in the Sud-Ubangi region of
northwestern DRC, Jezek et al. identified a total of 21 EHF
cases, indicating a possible ongoing occurrence of sporadic EBOV
infections in this population [65]. Similarly, during an investiga-
tion of MHF in Watsa Zone of northeastern DRC, which involved
multiple zoonotic introductions in miners working in gold mines
(and some subsequent secondary transmissions) between 1998 and
2000, medical staff reported the disease as a locally recognized
clinical entity in miners, occurring as far back as possibly the 1980s
[39]. Regardless, the overall burden of disease due to EHF and
MHF is clearly dwarfed in comparison to those of the 13 NTDs.
In contrast, when EHF and MHF are examined from a bottom
billion viewpoint, there are multiple factors supporting the notion
that disease, and particularly outbreaks, are components of
impoverished conditions. From a geographic standpoint, the bulk
of human disease has occurred in rural, and often highly remote,
locations in the central African countries of Angola, Gabon, RoC,
DRC, Sudan, and Uganda [4] (Figure 1), some of the least
developed locations in the world (for instance, see Table 2). As an
example of remoteness, 71.3% of the Gulu, Uganda (site of the
2000 EHF outbreak), population live more than 5 km from the
nearest health facility, while this percentage is only 0.7% in the
capital, Kampala [66]. Although the global distribution of NTDs
Table 1. Common routes of EHF and MHF spread, and interventions to stop transmission during outbreaks.
Route of Spread Intervention
Community transmission to family members and other close
contacts of EHF or MHF cases
Daily monitoring of all contacts of EHF and MHF cases and rapid transfer of sick
contacts to medical facility for evaluation
Contact with deceased EHF or MHF cases during preparation
of the body or funeral proceedings
Implementation of safe burial practices for all deceased individuals
Transmission in the health care setting from EHF or MHF cases
to medical staff by direct contact or contact with bodily fluids, or
to other patients through contaminated medical equipment
Establishment of isolation ward and provide clinical care by medical staff with
training specific to EHF and MHF outbreaks
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001546.t001
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high prevalence across this region of Africa [53,56].
Further defining the association between EHF and MHF and
impoverished conditions is the observation that amplification of
EBOV and MARV transmission commonly occurs in resource-
limited health care settings. In addition to transmission associated
with re-used medical equipment, many outbreaks involve trans-
mission (sometimes with high frequency) to medical staff caring for
patients [24–28]. Because EBOV and MARV transmission occurs
through direct physical contact with an infected person, bodily
fluids, or through contact with contaminated clothes or linens,
transmission to health care staff and patients can largely be
controlled through implementation of barrier nursing practices for
individuals with hemorrhagic symptoms and ensuring that needles
or other medical equipment that may contain contaminated fluids
are not reused.
Although EHF and MHF may not have the regional or national
poverty-promoting effects as some NTDs, the local effects of an
outbreak on a village, town, or region can be devastating. Tens to
hundreds of deaths have occurred in previous outbreaks.
Additionally, these conditions are highly stigmatizing [67–69].
Sick patients, medical staff, as well as those who have recovered,
commonly face fear and rejection or stigmatization from the local
community. Furthermore, the long-term health and psychosocial
impacts of EHF and MHF on survivors can be challenging; studies
demonstrate post-infection sequelae, as well as prolonged poor
health, among those who survived EBOV or MARV infection
[69–74].
The impact of EHF or MHF on local health systems can be
similarly devastating, particularly for individuals in needs of
standard medical care not associated with hemorrhagic fever. In
the series of Durba-Watsa MHF cases associated with the Durba
mine in northwest DRC, the only physician available at Watsa
(district) hospital died of presumed MHF in 1994 and no physician
was available in the district from 1994 to 1996. A second physician
died of MHF in 1999, again leaving the hospital with no available
Figure 1. Location of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (red circles) and Marburg hemorrhagic fever (green squares) outbreaks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001546.g001
Table 2. Select economic and health indicators for countries with previous large outbreaks of Ebola or Marburg hemorrhagic fever
(total number of countries which rank is based on).
Per Capita Income (228
a)
Infant Mortality per
1,000 Live Births (223
a)
Life Expectancy in
Years, at Birth (222
a)
Physicians per 1,000
Population (192
a)
Angola US$8,200 (121) 175.9 (1) 38.76 (222) 0.08 (169)
Democratic Republic of Congo US$300 (227) 78.43 (14) 55.33 (199) 0.11 (163)
Gabon US$14,500 (80) 49.95 (49) 52.49 (207) 0.29 (141)
Republic of Congo US$4,100 (158) 76.05 (15) 54.91 (200) 0.10 (166)
Sudan US$2,300 (184) 102.00 (6)
b 55.42 (198) 0.28 (143)
Uganda US$1,300 (204) 62.47 (29) 53.24 (204) 0.12 (161)
Data from The World Factbook, CIA (accessed December 15, 2011).
aAvailable number of countries, which rank is based on.
bData is specific to South Sudan.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001546.t002
www.plosntds.org 3 June 2012 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e1546physician. Similarly, the medical director and 11 staff members for
a major hospital died of EHF in the Gulu, Uganda, outbreak in
2000 [75,76]. Beyond the deaths of specific individuals, outbreaks
have also had severe effects on the actual functioning of medical
services. For instance, the Kikwit, DRC, EHF outbreak in 1995
resulted in the infection of 80 health care workers and the closure
of Kikwit General Hospital for non-EHF related activities, severely
limiting the availability of medical care to the population of Kikwit
(200,000), as well as surrounding areas [26,29].
An additional defining characteristic of the 13 NTDs is the
absence of an available vaccine [77]. Moran et al. previously noted
that funding for development of pharmaceutical tools for
prevention or treatment is limited for many of the NTDs. For
instance, of 2.5 billion US dollars devoted to research and
development of new neglected disease products, almost 80% was
applied to HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria, with approximately 2%
devoted to helminths, and less than 0.1% devoted to Buruli ulcer
or trachoma [78]. Regardless, pharmaceutical treatments and cost
effective control measures are available for most NTDs [53,56],
underscoring a need for improved implementation of treatment
and control efforts. Even in the absence of a vaccine, cases of
dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease) have drastically declined
through basic public health measures, and guinea-worm eradica-
tion is anticipated in the near future [79]. Similarly, no currently
licensed vaccines or therapeutics are available for EHF or MHF
(discussed further below). While the available funding for research
and development of these products may contrast most NTDs, the
fact that effective public health measures to prevent or control
EHF and MHF are already known is consistent with the above
observation for other NTDs.
Ways Forward
Improved Surveillance and Health Care Safety
As noted above, a common characteristic of large EHF and
MHF outbreaks is the break-down (or absolute lack of) public
health surveillance, resulting in long periods of time before
identification of the outbreak by public health authorities. With
improved surveillance, early chains of transmission can be
identified and outbreak response efforts rapidly applied. As an
example, during the recent reemergence of EHF in Luwero
district, Uganda (May 2011), viral hemorrhagic fever was
immediately suspected in the index (and only case) by clinicians
at the hospital. While in a rural area, Luwero is located less than
2 hours by vehicle from the capital of Uganda (Kampala). A
confirmatory laboratory diagnosis was acquired in less than a
week, and outbreak response activities commenced within
24 hours [80]. While contacts of this EHF case fortunately did
not develop disease, the ability to identify and follow-up all
contacts would have resulted in prevention of further spread of the
virus, should secondary cases have developed.
Public health approaches for NTDs have traditionally focused on
vertical drug-based treatment strategies [53,54]. However, the
importance of integrationof NTD control intobroad health systems
is now being recognized [81,82]. Moreover, technical guidelines by
the WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) and Member States
were recently released for the Integrated Disease Surveillance and
Response (IDSR) strategy [83]. The IDSR recommends integrated
surveillance of multiple infectious diseases to broaden the ability to
detect and respond to infectious diseases of epidemic potential or
those targeted for eradication or elimination. Priority diseases
included in the 2010 IDSR guidelines include EHF and MHF, as
well as a number of other NTDs, including Buruli ulcer,
dracunculiasis, leprosy, lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, tracho-
ma, and trypanosomiasis. While public health resources are limited
across sub-Saharan Africa, and challenges still exist in its
integration, studies have demonstrated tangible improvement of
surveillance as a result of IDSR implementation [84].
Laboratory diagnostics are a crucial component of public health
surveillance, and efforts needtobemadetoensurecapacityfor rapid
diagnostic testing for EHF and MHF across sub-Saharan Africa, as
well as the ability to rule out other tropical infections. In the above
noted EHF case in Uganda in May 2011, in-country laboratory
capacity was available, and a rapid diagnosis was made on the index
case, allowing for an immediate public health response [80].
Of additional importance to the control of EHF and MHF is the
prevention of health care–associated spread of the viruses. The
fact that basic contact precautions (gowns and gloves) can largely
block spread of EHF and MHF in health care settings underscores
the effect of poverty on the spread of these diseases. Efforts to
provide greater availability of basic medical supplies to rural
health care settings in central Africa would help minimize the risk
of large outbreaks of EHF and MHF, as well as have the broad
benefit of preventing non-related health care–associated infections
in patients and health care workers, and ensure greater patient
safety. A recent report by Marchal et al. stressed potential linkages
between NTD control and improvement of health systems [82].
While infection control during medical care is only one aspect of
the entire health system, renewed focus on improving health
systems may have a direct impact on prevention of initial spread,
and ultimately outbreaks, of EHF and MHF.
Vaccines and Anti-Viral Therapies for EHF and MHF
Extensive research efforts over the past decade have focused on
development of vaccines and anti-viral therapies for EHF and
MHF, and currently there are numerous promising products in
development [85–87]. This evidence suggests there may be an
optimistic picture for future licensing of efficacious biologic-based
measures for EHF and MHF. But are these applicable for those
most at risk for disease? There are two scenarios to consider:
vaccines that are administered before the exposure, which prevent
disease, and vaccines or anti-viral therapies that can be
administered after the exposure (either before or possibly after
onset of disease) to prevent or improve the clinical prognosis of
illness. From an occupation-based risk standpoint, prophylactic
vaccination will be clearly a valuable preventive measure, both for
individuals with potential exposure in the laboratory or through
ecological work, as well as medical and public health personal
involved in hands-on outbreak response activities.
When we consider those at risk of endemic exposure to EBOV
or MARV—the bottom billion—the potential value of prophy-
lactic vaccination becomes murky. A scenario in which one
envisions applying vaccine across the entire endemic population in
sub-Saharan Africa is unrealistic. Given the total burden of
filovirus disease (,2,300 total cases identified since 1967),
attempting the administration of millions of doses of vaccine has
limited justification, particularly considering the current ongoing
challenge of establishing high levels of coverage of routine
immunizations in many endemic areas. For instance, estimated
coverage of polio and measles among 1-year-olds in Uganda in
2009 was 59% and 68%, respectably [88].
A second prophylactic vaccination strategy would be to apply a
targeted or mass vaccination campaign to an entire region, in the
event of an outbreak. Given the nature of the spread of EBOV and
MARV in outbreak settings (chains of person-to-person transmis-
sion), the efficacious outbreak control measure already developed
(contact tracing, isolation, and safe burials), and the scope of even
the largest outbreaks (Gulu, Uganda in 2000 with 425 EHF cases
www.plosntds.org 4 June 2012 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e1546is the largest known outbreak), the application of mass vaccination
would not be an efficient or cost effective control mechanism, and
would likely draw resources and public personnel away from
outbreak control activities. Additionally, if vaccine is administered
to an exposed individual during the incubation period and disease
subsequently develops, there is a risk that those administering the
vaccine will be perceived by the local population as spreading the
disease, which would undermine efforts to further implement
vaccination or other control methods.
A final strategy, in the instance of a vaccine or anti-viral drug
with the potential to prevent or minimize severity of disease, would
be to apply these measures to high risk contacts of suspected or
confirmed EHF or MHF cases, as well as to those who are already
ill (and in isolation). This activity, if measures can be administered
early enough to be effective, would inevitably save lives and would
be an incentive for suspected patients to enter isolation. However,
from an outbreak control standpoint, a symptomatic individual
tracked through contact tracing activities is in essence removed
from the ‘‘transmitter pool’’, and shortly after onset of symptoms
(and infectiousness) will be placed under safe isolation for proper
medical care. Similarly, sick individuals, already in properly
managed isolation, would not further propagate the virus. Thus,
while having potential therapeutic value, post-exposure biologics
may have limited impact on the scope of EHF or MHF outbreaks.
Finally, it worth reiterating in the broad context of vaccines or
anti-viral therapies for outbreak settings, that any application is
contingent on identification of the outbreak. Since traditionally in
large outbreaks, a high proportion of cases occur before outbreak
identification, biologic-based prevention measures would have no
impact on these cases. With effective surveillance, initial cases can
be identified rapidly, minimizing the overall impact of the
outbreak through classic outbreak control measures. Thus, while
not a stand-alone intervention for outbreak control, application of
anti-viral therapies may help lower the overall impact of fatalities
in EHF and MHF outbreaks.
Conclusions
Those most at risk for EHF and MHF are residents of rural
central Africa, many of whom are among the bottom billion.
Outbreaks of EHF and MHF are commonly associated with
limited public health surveillance and inadequate medical
preventive measures, both partially the result of impoverished
conditions. Effective methods to prevent and control EHF and
MHF are well understood. While challenging, efforts to combine
control of these diseases with other NTDs, through mechanisms
such as integrated surveillance and improvement of health
systems, would provide a combined benefit to populations in
rural central Africa. While multiple candidate vaccines and anti-
viral therapies against EBOV and MARV are currently in
development, classical public health surveillance and outbreak
control guidelines will likely remain the cornerstone of disease
control. However, modern therapies have the potential to
minimize the number of EHF and MHF deaths in outbreak
settings.
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